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Balance and Team Production 
Kelli A. Alces* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
For decades, those holding the shareholder primacy view that the 
purpose of a corporation is to earn a profit for its shareholders have been 
debating with those who believe that corporations exist to serve broader 
societal interests.1 Adolph Berle and Merrick Dodd began the conversa-
tion over eighty years ago,2 and it continues today, with voices at various 
places along a spectrum of possible corporate purposes participating. 
Unfortunately, over time, the various sides of the debate have begun to 
talk past each other rather than engage with each other and have lost 
sight of whatever common ground they may be able to find between 
them. 
This Essay shows how the gaps between the two perspectives may 
be bridged, or how the two camps may be brought closer to engaging in 
meaningful dialogue, by considering the insights contained in Margaret 
                                                 
* Loula Fuller & Dan Myers Professor of Law, Florida State University. I am grateful to Anthony 
Casey and participants in the Berle VI symposium for helpful comments on this project. 
 1. See, e.g., Lucian A. Bebchuk, The Case for Increasing Shareholder Power, 118 HARV. L. 
REV. 833 (2005) (arguing that corporate managers are responsible to shareholders and must work to 
maximize shareholder value); E. Merrick Dodd, Jr., For Whom Are Corporate Managers Trustees?, 
45 HARV. L. REV. 1145 (1932) (arguing that corporate managers have a responsibility to serve socie-
tal interests); Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, The Corporate Contract, 89 COLUM. L. 
REV. 1416 (1989) (arguing, contra the “entity” theory, that a corporation is a “nexus” of contracts 
and not a stand-alone entity, and so corporate managers are simply responsible for abiding by the 
corporate contracts); David Millon, Theories of the Corporation, 1990 DUKE L.J. 201 (1990) (argu-
ing that corporations, as “entities” and “citizens,” should behave as responsible citizens for the bene-
fit of society); Milton Friedman, The Social Responsibility of Business Is to Increase Its Profits, N.Y. 
TIMES MAG , Sept. 13, 1970, at 32, available at http://www.colorado.edu/studentgroups/libertarians/ 
issues/friedman-soc-resp-business.html (arguing that corporate managers have a social responsibility 
to work to maximize shareholder value). 
 2. See, e.g., Adolf A. Berle, Corporate Powers As Powers in Trust, 44 HARV. L. REV. 1049 
(1931); Adolf A. Berle, For Whom Corporate Managers Are Trustees  A Note, 45 HARV. L. REV. 
1365 (1932); Dodd, supra note 1. 
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Blair and Lynn Stout’s A Team Production Theory of Corporate Law.3 
Blair and Stout paint a picture of corporate governance that helps explain 
why the business judgment rule works as it does and how corporate 
boards can legally and properly make a variety of decisions in particular 
situations.4 They show how it is permissible for a board to make deci-
sions that appear to place the interests of nonshareholder stakeholders 
before the immediate interests of shareholders without running afoul of 
their duties under corporate law.5 
Though Blair and Stout purport to reject shareholder primacy 
throughout the article, their insights do not necessarily undermine a real-
istic shareholder primacy view of corporate governance.6 Rather, their 
description of the board of directors and proper corporate objectives pro-
vides a positive account of how directors manage the coalition of inter-
ests that make up the corporation.7 This account does not render share-
holder wealth maximization impossible. To the contrary, it shows how, 
as with any business decision, there are costs associated with maximizing 
returns. Encouraging other stakeholders to participate in the corporate 
enterprise may impose costs on the corporation, but those costs are in-
tended to be outweighed by returns to investors in the form of enhanced 
shareholder wealth.8 Viewed in this light, Blair and Stout’s team produc-
tion model fits well with the economic account of the modern corpora-
tion. 
The traditional economic account of the corporation supposes that 
shareholders are the effective owners of the firm, while directors—
essentially the agents of the shareholders—are charged with maximizing 
corporate wealth for the benefit of the residual claim.9 Shareholders are 
usually the residual claimants; however, as a firm becomes insolvent and 
creditors take over the residual claim, the duty to maximize corporate 
wealth inures to the creditors’ benefit.10 The residual claimants have in-
centives that are best aligned with those of the corporate entity such that 
                                                 
 3. Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, A Team Production Theory of Corporate Law, 85 VA. L. 
REV. 247 (1999). 
 4. See generally id. 
 5. Id. at 307. 
 6. Id. at 257. 
 7. Id. at 280–81. 
 8. Id. at 288–89. 
 9. Alan J. Meese, The Team Production Theory of Corporate Law  A Critical Assessment, 43 
WM. & MARY L. REV. 1629, 1631 (2002). 
 10. See Barry E. Adler, Financial and Political Theories of American Corporate Bankruptcy, 
45 STAN. L. REV. 311, 313 (1993). 
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one could assume that what is best for the residual claim is best for the 
corporation as a whole. 
On the other hand, those who reject shareholder primacy, including 
Blair and Stout, argue that directors are given great autonomy to choose 
to prefer the interests of a variety of stakeholders depending on the cir-
cumstances.11 They argue that shareholder interests will not always yield 
the best corporate outcomes and that boards should be, and are, free to 
prefer other interests in order to maximize the value of the corporate en-
terprise as a whole.12 Likewise, they argue that if we can understand di-
rectors as something other than the shareholders’ agents, then not only 
will we have reached a more accurate understanding of corporate gov-
ernance, but embracing that view will lead to better governance decisions 
as directors will feel completely liberated to make the “right” choices.13 
In this Essay, I will bring these competing ideas together and show 
how they are compatible within one description of modern corporate 
governance. As Blair and Stout point out, balance is the key to harmoniz-
ing conflicting views of directors’ duties.14 However, finding balance 
does not come at the expense of maximizing the value of the residual 
claim. For example, a corporation that takes extraordinary risks on a reg-
ular basis may find it difficult to borrow money or find business partners 
willing to extend credit, and may also have trouble retaining competent 
employees. On the other hand, a firm that stagnates for having taken 
minimal risk and having been operated for the benefit of creditors and 
employees may eventually fail, harming the very parties whose interests 
it was trying to protect.15 Corporate governance, in all of its forms, seeks 
to balance the interests of constituent parties and management in order to 
maximize the value of the residual claim. While managerial fiat exercised 
to other ends may not be easily punished under the law,16 it is not re-
warded either, and such managers or directors may find themselves 
without further employment or find that their value on the market is di-
minished. 
                                                 
 11. Blair & Stout, supra note 3, at 280. 
 12. Id. at 280–81 (“Thus, the primary job of directors of a public corporation is not to act as 
agents who ruthlessly pursue shareholders’ interests at the expense of employees, creditors, or other 
team members. Rather, the directors are trustees for the corporation itself—mediating hierarchs 
whose job is to balance team members’ competing interests in a fashion that keeps everyone happy 
enough that the productive coalition stays together.”). 
 13. Id. 
 14. Id. at 316. 
 15. The management of General Motors, which purportedly ran the company for the benefit of 
trade unions and creditors in the 1990s and 2000s, provides such an example. See infra notes 98–105 
and accompanying text. 
 16. Blair & Stout, supra note 3, at 294. 
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This Essay proceeds in four parts. Part II begins by reviewing the 
relevant portions of the debate between “shareholder primacists” and 
those who believe that directors should make decisions that serve other 
stakeholders to the exclusion of shareholder interests. Blair and Stout 
position themselves somewhat in the middle of these two positions while 
maintaining that shareholder primacy is not a viable positive or norma-
tive theory.17 Because Blair and Stout’s claim is a moderate position, 
their work can serve as an effective gateway between the two sides. Part 
III cultivates an understanding of shareholder primacy that demonstrates 
that such a view is not necessarily incompatible with the corporate 
wealth maximization sought by Blair and Stout. Part IV considers what 
Blair and Stout mean by “balance” in corporate governance and shows 
how that balance can be a means to shareholder primacy ends. Part V 
briefly concludes. 
II. THE DEBATE 
The debate between those who believe a corporation’s purpose is 
maximizing profit and those who believe corporations exist for the great-
er social good has raged for decades. Adolph Berle and Merrick Dodd 
managed to truly engage with one another and make progress in reaching 
a greater understanding of the other’s position, with Berle eventually 
adopting Dodd’s position decades after their debate began.18 More re-
cently, modern scholars on opposite sides of the debate have all but 
stopped talking to each other. Instead, each side is so entrenched in its 
own position and believes the other to be completely, ideologically 
wrong that any sort of dialogue or compromise seems impossible. 
The shareholder primacy view of corporate law holds that corpora-
tions exist to generate profits for their owners, the shareholders.19 As 
such, when there is a choice between lowering costs or improving social 
conditions that will not enhance profits, a shareholder primacist would 
choose to lower costs in the interest of increasing profits. Where the in-
terests of the community, employees, creditors, or the environment con-
flict with the goal of increasing profits, pure shareholder primacists 
would argue that directors must choose the path that favors profit maxi-
mization.20 
                                                 
 17. Id. at 253–54. 
 18. William W. Bratton & Michael L. Wachter, Shareholder Primacy’s Corporatist Origins  
Adolf Berle and the Modern Corporation, 34 J. CORP. L. 99, 104 (2008). 
 19. Blair & Stout, supra note 3, at 287. 
 20. See Friedman, supra note 1. 
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Corporate social responsibility advocates, whom Blair and Stout 
call “progressives,” on the other hand, argue that corporations owe a duty 
to society to make business decisions that will advance the interests of 
corporate constituents other than shareholders, such as employees and 
the surrounding communities.21 The corporation can advance these con-
stituents’ interests by providing fair working conditions, charging rea-
sonable prices, and taking steps to preserve the environment at the ex-
pense of profit.22 Because their premises differ so substantially, share-
holder primacists and progressives rarely find common ground. 
Blair and Stout have positioned themselves between the two ex-
tremes, arguing that directors are mediating hierarchs that serve the in-
terests of all corporate stakeholders, not just shareholders.23 While the 
pursuit of profit may be a worthwhile goal, Blair and Stout suggest it is 
not the only permissible object of a board’s decision-making authority.24 
Furthermore, Blair and Stout argue that the team production theory, as 
they apply it to corporate governance, explains why directors have dis-
cretion to consider other interests, and that this discretion is the sort of ex 
ante understanding that allows the firm to exist and prosper in the first 
place.25 
This Part of the Essay will introduce the shareholder primacy ar-
gument and contrast it with the view of corporate governance developed 
by Blair and Stout in A Team Production Theory of Corporate Law. The 
precise contours of the debate between shareholder primacists and those 
advancing corporate social responsibility are beyond the scope of this 
Essay. For our purposes, it is only important to acknowledge where the 
two poles are and to see how Blair and Stout’s work can show us how to 
tell a consistent story about directors’ duties and corporate purpose. 
A. Shareholder Primacy—Basic Argument 
The shareholder primacy view, as Blair and Stout call it, is the tra-
ditional economic agency view of corporate governance. As traditionally 
presented, the theory holds that shareholders are the owners of a corpora-
tion, and they hire directors to manage the business and affairs of the 
                                                 
 21. Blair & Stout, supra note 3, at 287. 
 22. See, e.g., Dodd, supra note 1; Millon, supra note 1; David Millon, Redefining Corporate 
Law, 24 IND. L. REV. 223 (1991); Lawrence E. Mitchell, A Critical Look at Corporate Governance, 
45 VAND. L. REV. 1263 (1992). 
 23. Blair & Stout, supra note 3, at 287–89. 
 24. Indeed, as the authors observe, “modern corporate law does not adhere to the norm of 
shareholder primacy. To the contrary, case law interpreting the business judgment rule often explic-
itly authorizes directors to sacrifice shareholders’ interests to protect other constituencies.” Id. at 303. 
 25. Id. at 287–89. 
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corporation on their behalf.26 Shareholders vote to elect directors for this 
purpose, and those directors, in turn, choose and monitor senior officers 
who will run the day-to-day business of the firm. The purpose of a corpo-
ration under this view is to maximize profit for the benefit of sharehold-
ers. 
The traditional view has matured over the course of time. Share-
holders remain the putative owners of the firm, but only because of their 
role as residual claimants when the firm is solvent. In this regard, options 
theory holds that all claimants on the firm’s assets hold options in the 
value of those assets.27 Shareholders do not hold a special position as 
“owners” according to that account. Instead, depending on one’s per-
spective, shareholders can hold one of two kinds of options in the firm’s 
assets. Shareholders can be seen as holding a call option on the residual 
claim that they can exercise by paying off debt when the firm is sol-
vent.28 Conversely, when a firm is insolvent, shareholders can exercise a 
put option and sell the firm’s assets to creditors for the value of the 
firm’s debt.29 
Options theory maps onto the traditional account by highlighting 
the shifting interests in the firm’s assets, depending on the firm’s finan-
cial stability. When a firm is insolvent, its junior-most creditors hold 
claims that may be paid something, rather than nothing, and now occupy 
the role of residual claimants. Shareholders will have exercised their put 
option, and creditors now occupy the position of wanting to enhance the 
value of the firm’s assets for their own benefit. Those who favor share-
holder primacy when a firm is solvent, then, will also argue that the firm 
should be operated for the benefit of creditors in bankruptcy because jun-
ior creditors then hold the residual claim.30 The residual claim is favored 
because it best represents the value of corporate wealth, and thus, the 
value of corporate well-being. What is good for the value of the residual 
claim should be good for the viability of the company, and thus, good for 
all those holding claims against the corporation’s assets, including em-
ployees, shareholders, and creditors. 
                                                 
 26. Meese, supra note 9, at 1631. 
 27. Frank Partnoy, Adding Derivatives to the Corporate Law Mix, 34 GA. L. REV. 599, 609–12 
(2000) (explaining the application of options theory to corporate governance). 
 28. Id. at 609–10 (describing the call option perspective). 
 29. Id. at 610–11 (explaining the put option perspective wherein equity has sold a put option to 
debt, allowing equity to sell the firm to debt if the value of the firm’s assets falls below the amount 
of debt). 
 30. See Adler, supra note 10 (arguing that the residual claimants may change during the life of 
the firm, but current residual claimants should always have the most power to influence manage-
ment). 
2015] Balance and Team Production 193 
The shareholder primacy economic model’s depiction of directors 
as literal “agents” of shareholders has also been relaxed. It is generally 
understood that directors owe no duty of obedience to shareholders.31 If 
there were a duty of obedience, which shareholders would the directors 
be bound to obey? Shareholders may have divergent or even conflicting 
interests. Additionally, what would the mechanism of that control be? 
The business judgment rule protects directors from liability to sharehold-
ers for failure to obey, among other things, and shareholder voting is un-
likely to be an effective mechanism to enforce the will of shareholders on 
directors’ decision making. Shareholders are not able to vote on specific 
day-to-day business decisions and may only approve or disapprove sig-
nificant, game-changing decisions such as mergers and electing directors. 
Even though directors are not literally subject to direct control by 
shareholders, and so may not technically be considered agents of share-
holders (or any other identifiable group with a distinct voice), they still 
present agency costs. Directors impose agency costs because they are 
managing assets that do not belong to them in order to realize profits for 
others. Directors have incentives to shirk and self-deal in ways that could 
harm the financial interests of others, and directors do not internalize all 
of the costs of their behavior. Directors are working on behalf of others, 
even if they are not bound to obey those others, and those others lack 
legal recourse in many instances where directors may disappoint their 
hopes or expectations. Because we expect directors to act for the benefit 
of others, and not for themselves, the law and private contracting must 
try to design incentives that prevent directors from self-dealing or using 
their power to harm those they are charged with helping. Those working 
within the standard economic paradigm look for ways to minimize the 
agency costs imposed by corporate directors. Those agency costs are de-
fined as incentives directors may have to appropriate corporate wealth to 
themselves. 
The agency costs posed by directors and the entity for which they 
work are central to the disagreement between shareholder primacists and 
those in favor of corporate social responsibility. Shareholder primacists 
think that agency costs should be limited so that the value of the residual 
claim is increased.32 They argue that the divergence between directors’ 
                                                 
 31. The business judgment rule and the cases interpreting it make clear that directors are under 
no obligation to make the business decisions shareholders would necessarily want them to make. 
Directors are not subject to liability provided they exercise good faith and informed judgment that 
they honestly believe to be in the best interest of the corporation. Blair & Stout, supra note 3, at 
299–300. 
 32. Bebchuk, supra note 1, at 850. 
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personal interests and shareholders’ economic interests should be mini-
mized and that directors should be held accountable to maximizing 
shareholder wealth.33 Maximizing the value of the residual claim, they 
argue, will maximize the value of the corporation, and that rising tide of 
corporate profits will raise all ships, from shareholders to directors.34 
B. Blair and Stout—Team Production 
On the other hand, those advocating corporate social responsibility 
think that directors have a duty (or should have a duty) to consider a va-
riety of constituencies in making corporate decisions.35 Because directors 
are the leaders of a social enterprise and corporations must be responsi-
ble citizens of our world,36 they must work for some greater, less-defined 
social good. They have some other “corporate” and societal benefit to 
seek. Those advocating this belief, “progressives” as Blair and Stout call 
them, would put societal interests ahead of corporate wealth maximiza-
tion.37 
While Blair and Stout do not subscribe to the “progressive” corpo-
rate social responsibility view, they do argue that the corporation should 
not be run solely for the benefit of shareholders.38 They see the corpora-
tion as a combination of inputs from various team members.39 These 
team members then delegate control over coordination of their inputs to a 
board of directors.40 Accordingly, Blair and Stout argue that the board 
does not owe allegiance to any one stakeholder, but rather, is empowered 
to do what is “best” for the corporate enterprise.41 The board should hon-
or the interests of all team members as necessary to maximize the wel-
fare of the entire enterprise. 
In developing their theory, Blair and Stout draw on the Alchian and 
Demsetz notion of team production to make their point about how corpo-
rate governance operates.42 In a team production situation, a number of 
team members contribute inputs, but the product of the team’s efforts 
                                                 
 33. Id. 
 34. Id. 
 35. Colin P. Marks, Jiminy Cricket for the Corporation  Understanding Corporate “Con-
science”, 42 VAL. U. L. REV. 1129, 1148 (2008). 
 36. See id. 
 37. Blair & Stout, supra note 3, at 287. 
 38. Id. at 254. 
 39. Id. at 275. 
 40. Id. at 277. 
 41. Id. at 254. 
 42. Id. at 265 (citing Armen A. Alchian & Harold Demsetz, Production, Information Costs, 
and Economic Organization, 62 AM. ECON. REV. 777 (1972)). 
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cannot be separated and directly linked to their individual efforts.43 As a 
result, it is impossible to know exactly what proportion of the final prod-
uct each individual team member is responsible for. 44  According to 
Alchian and Demsetz’s theory, in such situations, when it is difficult to 
distribute profits among team members in the face of necessarily incom-
plete contracts, a third party is given responsibility to monitor the team 
and distribute the proceeds of the team’s effort at fixed wages.45 Then the 
monitor—the hierarch—receives the residual returns. This would give 
the hierarch the incentive to maximize the value of the team.46 Blair and 
Stout adjust this model to claim that the board of directors is the monitor-
ing hierarch but that the corporation itself receives the residual returns on 
the team’s labor.47 
In its role as “mediating hierarch,” the board is supposed to use its 
discretion to make the decisions it believes are best for the corporate en-
terprise, even if those decisions are not the ones shareholders would pre-
fer or are not strictly best for maximizing shareholders’ risk-adjusted 
wealth.48 Shareholders can diversify away firm-specific risk in a way that 
employees and managers cannot. Creditors can price in the riskiness of 
the investment by charging higher interest rates and then can negotiate 
covenants that allow them to directly control the risks the company takes 
when the firm reaches an agreed-upon level of financial difficulty. When 
facing a decision with uncertain outcomes, various corporate constituents 
will have different preferences because they have different appetites for 
risk. Thus, potentially more profitable decisions that carry a higher risk 
of failure will not be as appealing to creditors or employees as they are to 
shareholders. As Blair and Stout point out, the board has the authority to 
choose the option that maximizes the expected return to the corporate 
enterprise from a risk-neutral standpoint, rather than pursuing the course 
of action shareholders would prefer.49 
There are, of course, many ways the shareholders’ preferences 
could differ from those of other corporate constituents. For example, tak-
ing into account only wealth-maximizing preferences, shareholders 
might prefer to cut costs by closing business locations or laying off 
                                                 
 43. Id. at 265–66. 
 44. Armen A. Alchian & Harold Demsetz, Production, Information Costs, and Economic Or-
ganization, 62 AM. ECON. REV. 777, 777–78 (1972). 
 45. Id. at 782. 
 46. Blair & Stout, supra note 3, at 266. 
 47. Id. at 269. 
 48. Id. at 280. 
 49. Id. at 295–96 (citing Credit Lyonnais Bank Nederland, N.V. v. Pathe Commc’ns Corp., Civ. 
A. No. 12150, 1991 WL 277613 (Del. Ch. Dec. 30, 1991)). 
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workers. Maximizing shareholder wealth might also mean making a de-
cision to conduct business in a manner that poses risks to the environ-
ment or lowers the value of surrounding property. Blair and Stout would 
argue that boards do not have to make these trade-offs if they believe 
they are acting in the corporation’s best interests.50 Accordingly, Blair 
and Stout note that the interests of the corporation need not be measured 
by the “bottom line” of the value of the residual claim.51  
In addition to their focus on corporate welfare as a whole, Blair and 
Stout strongly reject shareholder primacy. They point out that, as a posi-
tive matter, shareholder primacy is not legally required—nothing in cor-
porate law requires directors to favor shareholder interests, and directors 
are not held liable for favoring the interests of other stakeholders.52 They 
also make the normative claim that making shareholder wealth maximi-
zation the primary concern of corporate decision making is bad for the 
corporation itself, society, and even for shareholders in the long run.53 
That begs the question of how we measure the “interests of the cor-
poration” and then balance those interests against shareholder wealth 
maximization. How do we know that something is good for the corpora-
tion even though it may not enhance corporate wealth? Alchian and 
Demsetz spoke in terms of maximizing the wealth generated by the 
team.54 Blair and Stout also concede that the value of a company’s stock 
is often a useful tool for determining the value of the corporate enterprise 
as a whole, and that even if shareholders are not the residual claimants, 
that the residual claim is a useful proxy for corporate value.55 A corpo-
rate decision may be beneficial to employees or the community or sup-
pliers, but how can we tell if it is also good for the corporation? How will 
we know when those interests are properly balanced without regard to 
corporate wealth, as measured by the value of the residual claim? How 
literally should we take the agency analogy of shareholder primacy, how 
literally should we take the depiction of board fiat and authority in Blair 
and Stout’s team production theory, and how can we reconcile the theo-
ries? 
Part III will consider the different understandings of shareholder 
primacy that persist in the debate about the appropriate role of share-
holder interests in corporate governance. The analysis will reveal that a 
                                                 
 50. Id. at 300–01. 
 51. Id. 
 52. Id. at 288–89. 
 53. Id. at 305. 
 54. Alchian & Demsetz, supra note 44, at 778. 
 55. Blair & Stout, supra note 3, at 289. 
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balanced, moderate understanding of shareholder primacy is perfectly 
consistent with Blair and Stout’s theory of team production in corporate 
governance. Additionally, the analysis will show that Blair and Stout do 
not need to maintain that shareholder interests are irrelevant to corporate 
decision making, or even that shareholder interests should be resisted. 
Rather, a correct understanding of shareholder primacy leads to the con-
clusion that the interests of corporate constituents need to be balanced in 
order to maximize shareholder wealth. 
III. THE DIFFERENT FACES OF SHAREHOLDER PRIMACY 
David Millon has defined the shareholder primacy norm as 
“mandat[ing] that management—the corporation’s directors and senior 
officers—devote its energies to the advancement of shareholder interests. 
If pursuit of this objective conflicts with the interests of one or more of 
the corporation’s nonshareholder constituencies, management is to disre-
gard such competing considerations.” 56  Though shareholder primacy 
may sound simple, it has proven to be an elusive concept. The command 
to maximize the value of a corporation’s equity, as measured by stock 
price, seems like it would be one that is capable of precise definition and 
measurement. It surely seems that one could consider a set of outcomes, 
calculate their expected values for shareholders, and choose the course of 
action that has the highest expected value for the equity position. Of 
course, it is not that easy. For example, the likelihood that a particular 
outcome will occur is uncertain, as are the values of those outcomes; 
similarly, shareholders’ risk preferences and investment time horizons 
vary and are also uncertain. Directors and officers simply do not have 
enough information to just “do the math” and choose the wealth-
maximizing course of action. 
Even if corporate executives did have all of the information they 
would need to choose the decision whose outcome has the highest ex-
pected value for shareholders, differing risk preferences may make that 
the wrong choice for enhancing the value of the residual claim, if share-
holders are no longer the residual claimants. Further, if all public compa-
nies were to make decisions with too great of an appetite for risk, that 
may compromise corporate value, and so portfolio value, for even well-
diversified shareholders. If all shareholder primacy tells us is to make 
decisions that will maximize the expected value of shareholders, then it 
                                                 
 56. D. Gordon Smith, The Shareholder Primacy Norm, 23 J. CORP. L. 277, 282 (1998) (citing 
David Millon, Communitarianism in Corporate Law  Foundations and Law Reform Strategies, in 
PROGRESSIVE CORPORATE LAW 1 (Lawrence E. Mitchell ed., 1995)). 
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does not tell us anything useful. To define shareholder primacy in such 
limited terms is to set up a straw man. 
This Part will provide a definition of shareholder primacy that will 
show that maximizing shareholder value does not conflict with a team 
production view of corporate governance. While any precise definition of 
shareholder primacy is subject to debate, I will argue that a nuanced un-
derstanding of shareholder wealth maximization is the key to sustained 
growth and profitability, and, therefore, promotes shareholder interests. 
Holding that interest as a guiding principle in corporate decision making 
allows corporate executives to manage the firm most efficiently for its 
investors, constituents, and society. 
A. Strict Shareholder Wealth Maximization 
An account of shareholder primacy that requires directors to make 
decisions that provide the greatest expected value to shareholders is the 
view most vilified by the theory’s opponents.57 What I call strict share-
holder primacy would require considering only return to shareholders 
when making decisions, maximizing that return assuming full diversifi-
cation, and so making decisions consistent with a nearly unlimited appe-
tite for risk. In other words, directors would seek to maximize a firm’s 
stock price at each moment. Under a strict shareholder primacy view, 
managers would always seek to preserve shareholder power throughout 
the corporation’s life cycle, would negotiate deals with other constituents 
so as to lower all costs, thereby enhancing shareholder profit, and would 
always resolve difficult decisions in favor of immediate shareholder 
wealth. 
Moreover, strict shareholder primacy would require not just operat-
ing the business for a profit, but seeking to mathematically optimize that 
profit at every opportunity. Followed to its logical conclusion, that re-
quirement would indeed be troubling. Not only is it often impossible to 
know in advance which course of action would maximize expected re-
turn on the corporation’s stock price on a given day, but decisions made 
in favor of short-term profits may compromise long-term goals and via-
bility.58 Shareholders within the same corporation may have different 
                                                 
 57. Including corporate social responsibility theorists, movies, and all others opposed to share-
holder primacy. See Marks, supra note 35, at 1148; Larry E. Ribstein, Wall Street and Vine  Holly-
wood’s View of Business (Univ. of Ill. Law & Econ., Research Paper No. LE05–010, 2009), availa-
ble at http://ssrn.com/abstract=563181. 
 58. Mark Roe, Corporate Short-Termism—In the Boardroom and in the Courtroom, 68 BUS. 
LAW. 977, 978–79 (2013). 
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time horizons for their investments and so would have different prefer-
ences for the firm’s business activities.59 
One of the more strenuous objections to shareholder primacy is the 
claim that it promotes “short-termism,” the tendency of managers to seek 
short-term profits at the expense of long-term growth and profitability in 
order to please today’s shareholders and thereby raise stock prices.60 
Critics of shareholder primacy argue that short-termism is exacerbated 
by incentive compensation that focuses on quarterly (so, short-term) 
earnings and profits, as well as the company’s share price within particu-
lar windows.61 A manager so incentivized will want to produce good 
numbers in the short term in order to boost her compensation. A CEO 
with an average tenure of seven years may well have moved on by the 
time the long-term consequences of her short-termist decisions are real-
ized.62 Short-termism does not only afflict officers who may be driven by 
their compensation packages. Directors may also make decisions in favor 
of short-term results at the expense of long-term interests if influenced 
by powerful shareholders, such as hedge funds, who have short-term in-
vestment horizons.63 
There is little argument about whether short-termism would be a 
bad thing; the consensus is that it would be.64 Rather, the debate about 
short-termism centers on whether it is a decision-making flaw that man-
agers are actually vulnerable to. Some argue that the existence of short-
termism depends on a market imperfection that critics of shareholder 
primacy have yet to show.65 That is, if stock prices are meant to be the 
present discounted value of the corporation’s future income stream—and 
they are—then a realization that long-term value has been compromised 
would result in a lower stock price today or would encourage more firms 
to invest in long-run interests in order to take advantage of the foregone 
                                                 
 59. Id. at 981. 
 60 . See generally LYNN STOUT, THE SHAREHOLDER VALUE MYTH: HOW PUTTING 
SHAREHOLDERS FIRST HARMS INVESTORS, CORPORATIONS, AND THE PUBLIC 63–73 (2012); Lynne 
Dallas, Short-Termism, The Financial Crisis, and Corporate Governance, 37 J. CORP. L. 265, 268 
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 61. STOUT, supra note 60, at 63–73. 
 62. Roe, supra note 58, at 980. 
 63. See Interview by David Bradley with Indra K. Nooyi, CEO, PepsiCo, in Aspen, Co. (June 
30, 2014), summarized in Conor Friedersdorf, Why PepsiCo CEO Indra K. Nooyi Can’t Have it All, 
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 64. See Roe, supra note 58, at 981–83 (noting “pernicious” effects of short-termism and citing 
numerous scholars who have outlined the problem). 
 65. Id. at 987–89. 
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long-term profits.66 In short, the imperfection would be competed away.67 
Therefore, if shareholders are aware that a firm has traded short-term 
gains for long-term viability, they should lower their estimation of the 
firm’s future income stream and thus lower the price they are willing to 
pay for the stock. Shareholders may not be able to make that adjustment 
without sufficient information or may not understand at the time a deci-
sion is made that that is what has happened. But if short-termism is a sys-
temic problem and a common way to run a corporation, as the opponents 
of shareholder primacy allege, then the market would adjust for the harm 
that practice causes. 
Of course, shareholders with short investment horizons may not 
care that a firm’s future prospects are slim. They may take advantage of a 
boost to the company’s stock price from one day’s good news and then 
sell the stock quickly, before the long-term bad news is apparent. If 
enough investors behave this way or trade at prices influenced by short-
term traders, then the ill effects of the short-term interests may be felt 
more broadly. Mark Roe refers to this as a “high-velocity trading fringe” 
that has distorted our impression of the dominant trading strategies in the 
market.68 
Other investors, such as hedge funds, may try to influence corporate 
decision making and then sell stock quickly to realize profits from the 
corporate policies they recommended.69 The amount of influence such 
shareholders have, then, will be relevant to whether managers make 
trade-offs in favor of short-term returns in the name of serving share-
holder interests. The degree of that influence is subject to debate. Lucian 
Bebchuk and Mark Roe assert separately that insulating boards from 
shareholders will not prevent short-termism and may well compromise 
long-term corporate value.70 Roe offers empirical evidence that suggests 
that the market as a whole may overvalue long-term returns,71 which, he 
argues, shows that “the market is not uniformly short term.”72 Bebchuk 
offers evidence that even hedge fund intervention, with a relatively short 
                                                 
 66. See Lucian A. Bebchuk, The Myth that Insulating Boards Serves Long-Term Value, 113 
COLUM. L. REV. 1637, 1642–43 (2013) (arguing that short-term interests do not necessarily affect 
board decision making so as to compromise long-term value); Roe, supra note 58, at 981–83. 
 67. Roe, supra note 58, at 981–83. 
 68. Id. at 977. 
 69. Dallas, supra note 60, at 294–95. 
 70. Bebchuk, supra note 66, at 1638; Roe, supra note 58, at 980. 
 71. Roe, supra note 58, at 980. 
 72. Id. 
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time horizon, can result in long-term benefits to a company’s perfor-
mance.73 
It is not clear, then, that abiding by shareholder wishes necessarily 
means seeking short-term returns at the expense of long-term viability. 
The strict understanding of shareholder primacy may not even accurately 
describe what shareholders want. Concerns that strict shareholder prima-
cy may lead to short-termism may be misplaced if shareholders are 
aware, as they seem to be, that short-termism does not benefit sharehold-
er value. 
Strict shareholder primacy is not only an impossible goal but one 
that few, if any, expect to see guiding corporate decision making.74 The 
strict view is a “caricature” that even supporters of shareholder primacy 
find inaccurately describes their position.75 To the extent those opposed 
to shareholder primacy argue that shareholder primacy means giving into 
shareholder desires to realize immediate returns at the expense of the 
longer-term survival of the firm, they mischaracterize the position of 
those they oppose. 
B. The Softer Side of Shareholder Primacy:  
The Shareholder Primacy Norm 
Most shareholder primacists would agree that managers must seek 
to maximize profit, but within constraints such as abiding by applicable 
regulations, labor market conditions, creditor demands, customer rela-
tions, and, indeed, the dictates of their own consciences.76 As Blair and 
Stout note, the corporate constituents that come together to form the cor-
poration and give it life will not agree to do business with the firm if they 
are not granted concessions that make investment in the firm attractive.77 
                                                 
 73. Bebchuk, supra note 66, at 1671–73. 
 74. See, e.g., Stephen Bainbridge, In Defense of the Shareholder Wealth Maximization Norm  
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 76. See supra note 74. 
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and the coalition will fall apart.”). 
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Sometimes, in order to convince an investor to participate, managers will 
have to concede power to that investor in certain situations—power that 
may, at times, trump even the power shareholders can exercise over 
management. This power would lead managers to decide in the 
nonshareholder investor’s favor should the special circumstances arise. 
A manager’s ability to absolutely maximize shareholder wealth is 
limited in many ways. The next section considers those limitations and 
develops a more realistic, workable view of shareholder primacy. This 
approach still makes maximization of the residual claim paramount in 
corporate decision making, but acknowledges the limitations imposed on 
that quest. 
When we allow for a more moderate, realistic view of shareholder 
primacy, it does not seem to be at odds with the team production theory 
at all. Indeed, the two theories of governance fit together seamlessly. To 
find the connection, however, we must first understand shareholder pri-
macy as a norm that guides corporate executives’ decision making. It 
means, at its core, that directors and officers should seek to operate the 
firm profitably by maximizing the value of the residual claim within ap-
plicable constraints. Not only is profit maximization not an absolute 
command, but it is impossible to achieve, as mentioned above. 
1. Residual Claim Primacy 
The equity interest, or the residual claim, is commonly considered 
the rising tide that raises all ships. If the residual claim grows, then all 
other claimants are paid in full, the firm is strong and healthy, and it will 
continue to operate and maybe even grow. In this regard, Blair and Stout 
acknowledge that the value of the residual claim is a useful proxy for 
corporate wealth. One challenge they mount against shareholder primacy 
is that the shareholder position does not represent the residual claim 
when the firm is insolvent.78 This excellent point is consistent with the 
justifications for shareholder primacy—the residual claim best represents 
corporate wealth, and maximizing that interest is the best way we can 
think of to be sure we are maximizing corporate wealth. 
The shareholder primacy norm is more properly stated as a “residu-
al claim primacy” norm. Both shareholder primacy and residual claim 
primacy rely on the same premise: that the holder of the residual claim 
has the financial incentive to promote corporate profitability and welfare. 
Both goals call on the corporation to take profitable risks to enhance the 
                                                 
 78. Blair & Stout, supra note 3, at 297. 
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expected return of the residual claim but also realize the residual claim-
ants will receive nothing (which is not their goal) if the firm fails. 
When the holders of the residual claim shift, so should the powers 
that attend it. For example, when a corporation is healthy, corporate law 
gives shareholders certain powers to influence directors and to enforce 
the corporate interest. However, when a firm is insolvent, it commonly 
enters bankruptcy (and may be forced into bankruptcy by creditors who 
believe that is where they will be best protected); the bankruptcy system 
places power in the hands of the creditors, now the residual claimants, to 
influence corporate decision making. Bankruptcy estates are operated for 
the benefit of creditors, and those managing bankrupt estates are bound 
to do so in a manner that maximizes creditor recovery to the greatest ex-
tent possible.79 
The problem Blair and Stout point to in making their argument 
about the shifting residual claim is an important one to address. Citing 
the famous footnote in the Credit Lyonnais decision,80 Blair and Stout 
argue that there are times when the expected value of a given course of 
action for shareholders gives them incentives to take large risks because 
they have nothing to lose and everything to gain when the firm is insol-
vent. Such risks could compromise the continued existence of the firm 
and sacrifice funds that would have been able to repay those with fixed 
claims. 
Furthermore, tensions always exist between the risk preferences of 
diversified shareholders and those of fixed claimants. As a result, share-
holders who have diversified away firm-specific risk are able to absorb 
losses suffered by one firm better than employees or suppliers can, and 
even better than some other creditors. They would rather take big risks to 
realize big rewards, while others may prefer that the firm be run more 
conservatively. 
However, that does not mean that shareholders, even well-
diversified shareholders, have an unlimited appetite for risk. As men-
tioned above, they would rather the residual claim, and so their interest in 
the firm, have some value rather than none. Further, while such share-
holders are protected from firm-specific risk imposed by any one compa-
ny, if every company were operated as though shareholders only craved 
extreme degrees of risk, the portfolio may suffer enough losses that 
                                                 
 79. See Michelle M. Harner, The Search for an Unbiased Fiduciary in Corporate Reorganiza-
tions, 86 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 469, 485–86 (2011). 
 80. Blair & Stout, supra note 3, at 296 (citing Credit Lyonnais Bank Nederland, N.V. v. Pathe 
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shareholders would no longer be well-protected.81  Indeed, conflicting 
risk preferences may even exist among different shareholders in the same 
corporation. Some shareholders may be better diversified than others, or 
they may have hedging investments that allow them to profit from a loss 
to another investment. Still, other shareholders may be invested in the 
firm’s competitors, or they may be employees of the company and hold 
their interests as employees paramount to their interests as shareholders. 
With all of the different risk preferences and interests shareholders 
themselves can have, and the different risk preferences and interests cor-
porate constituents can have, there is no one formula that will allow di-
rectors to always make the decision that is most consistent with “residual 
claim primacy.” When the path to wealth maximization is uncertain, di-
rectors are free to exercise their judgment and choose the course of ac-
tion they believe is best for the firm, and the business judgment rule 
shields them from liability for doing so.82 Balance is crucial—unlimited 
risk-taking would not be wise and would cause too many promising 
firms to fail, while operating a firm too conservatively could cause it to 
stagnate and keep it from profiting to the full extent of its potential, to 
the detriment of all of its constituents. What guidance do we give corpo-
rate managers? We tell them to do their best to maximize profits (the re-
sidual claim) within apposite constraints. Which managers are deemed 
the most successful and are rewarded for doing a great job? Not the ones 
that run unprofitable corporations. Thus, managers who ignore the value 
of the residual claim and run the corporation to other ends do so at their 
careers’ peril. 
2. Useful Proxy, Essential Guidance 
If residual claim primacy (within given constraints) is an acceptable 
understanding of shareholder primacy, then Blair and Stout’s objections 
to shareholder primacy unravel, and it becomes easier to see how share-
holder primacy fits within the mediating hierarchy theory of the board. 
However, Blair and Stout do acknowledge that shareholders “often are in 
the best position to represent the interests of the coalition that represents 
the firm.”83 They go on to say that it is appropriate for the shareholders’ 
                                                 
 81. In summarizing arguments made by another scholar, Stephen Bainbridge writes, “In other 
words, taking the argument to its logical extreme, it is acceptable to wipe out the entire shareholder 
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enforcement rights to shift to creditors when a firm is insolvent because 
at the point of insolvency, creditors are in the best position to represent 
the interests of the corporate coalition.84 So in most instances, and in all 
of the specific instances Blair and Stout point to, those whose financial 
interests are directly aligned with the value of the residual claim are most 
qualified to represent the corporate coalition. Pursuing the residual claim 
tends to maximize profit to the extent it is reasonable, legal, and sensible. 
Not only do Blair and Stout acknowledge that the value of the re-
sidual claim is often the best proxy for the well-being of the corporation 
as a whole, but they also do not give any other metrics we can use to de-
termine corporate well-being. And none come to mind. Corporate man-
agers could decide to make a decision that makes employees happy, for 
example by raising wages, but how do we tell if that decision is good for 
the corporation or just good for employees? We may never know how 
much the decision helps or hurts the firm’s profitability. But that uncer-
tainty does not change the fact that the corporation’s economic well-
being, as measured by the value of the residual claim, is the most reliable 
metric we have for corporate welfare. 
Measuring the value of the residual claim can be complicated, par-
ticularly for a healthy firm. Stout has pointed out that different share-
holders may have different valuations of a firm’s stock at a given point in 
time.85 The stock price is the market’s best guess as to the value of the 
residual claim (the market value of the firm’s equity), but it is just a 
guess, and it can be influenced or distorted by a variety of factors, in-
cluding market imperfections that say nothing about the future income 
stream of the firm’s assets. A company’s stock price may be vulnerable 
to manipulation or noise trading, and it is only as good as the information 
it is based on. Again, there is no magic number available at every mo-
ment that can tell us exactly what a company is worth. Even when so-
phisticated experts attempt to calculate a number, the best they can do is 
estimate a range. 
For these reasons, profit maximization is a goal, a guiding principle. 
It operates as a tie breaker or a way to strike a balance between compet-
ing interests. No one knows for sure which choice of several will maxim-
ize profits. No one knows for certain when it is appropriate to operate 
with short-term or long-term goals. That is why managers have discre-
tion and why the business judgment rule protects them from liability for 
informed, good faith decisions not involving self-dealing. Blair and Stout 
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are absolutely right to point out that corporate officers and directors have 
discretion to try to operate the company in the way they deem most suc-
cessful. But the measure of success is profitable survival. There is no 
other. 
There are, however, a number of decisions corporate managers 
could make that benefit shareholders as well as other constituents. That 
has to be true if we accept that shareholder value is the way we measure 
corporate well-being. And if we do not accept that shareholder value is 
the correct measure, we must designate some other way of determining 
whether something is good for a corporation. Corporations are only 
“healthy” if they can sustain a profitable business. If a business stops 
being profitable, it will either be taken over and made profitable or it will 
fail and liquidate.  
Profit maximization is a goal, an aspiration, and not a fixed, calcu-
lable requirement. While corporate managers should be trying to maxim-
ize profits to the greatest extent possible within applicable constraints, 
the constraints are numerous and no one can be sure ex ante, or even ex 
post, whether a particular decision is profit-maximizing. No one who 
supports a shareholder primacy view of corporate governance would ex-
pect to be able to enforce a more specific standard. And because we can-
not know how to maximize profit, and we do not have a particular defini-
tion of what profit maximization means or if it has been attained, strict 
profit maximization is not an appropriate standard, even under the share-
holder primacy theory. 
Instead, both shareholder primacy and corporate success require a 
balancing of interests, which makes them both consistent with, and not 
opposed to, Blair and Stout’s theory. Indra Nooyi, CEO of PepsiCo, ex-
plained it this way: 
So what we did was we said, “Why don’t we make the shifting of 
the portfolio, offering more nutritious products, offering more 
greens, offering more fruits and vegetable offerings, really becom-
ing an environmentally conscious company, and creating an envi-
ronment at PepsiCo where everyone can bring their whole self to 
work. Part of the agenda as to how we make money, not how we 
spend the money, but how we make money, and that got encapsu-
lated in these three words, “Performance with purpose.” It all start-
ed with performance. We want to deliver the greatest financial re-
turns. But we want to deliver those profits while we transform our 
product portfolio, worry about the planet, and worry about our peo-
ple. . . . And the fundamental difference between corporate social 
responsibility and performance with purpose is that performance 
with purpose is about how we make the money, not how we spend 
the money that we make. If we do not transform our portfolio, we 
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cannot make profits. If you’re not environmentally sustainable, you 
won’t get a license to open a plant and we won’t reduce the costs of 
our packaging. And if we don’t create a phenomenal workplace for 
our people, we won’t be able to hire the best and the brightest. So 
our purpose became how we deliver the profits. Too often, I think, 
people confuse purpose with corporate social responsibility which is 
a problem because you could run the company any way and then 
just do a charity program in some country, and then feel good. 
That’s corporate social responsibility. To me, that’s like going to 
confession after you’ve made a mistake. I think what we are talking 
about is weave purpose into how you run the company, into how 
you make money, then it’s a sustainable model and that’s what per-
formance with purpose is all about.86 
Profit—the bottom line—is the primary concern, and it drives how the 
other decisions are made and defines how to know if the reforms are 
making PepsiCo a better company. But because of the pressures from 
communities in which businesses operate—environmental laws, tax laws, 
immigration laws, labor laws, the labor market, the consumer market, the 
demands of creditors and other investors—profit must be maximized 
within constraints and can only be maximized at all if those constraints 
are honored. That is why profit maximization works with Blair and 
Stout’s theory—shareholder profit is the goal that gives shape to the oth-
er relationships within the firm. Directors know what terms to agree to 
with all constituents and know how to prioritize various parties’ interests 
because residual claim primacy is a guiding principle. This description of 
the balance among corporate constituents is the brightest contribution of 
A Team Production Theory of Corporate Law.87 
IV. CORPORATE GOVERNANCE BALANCE 
As Blair and Stout point out, boards are not properly agents of 
shareholders because they are not bound to obey shareholders. They are 
also not great shareholder representatives for similar reasons.88 As men-
tioned above, shareholders may have differing ideas about how the cor-
poration should maximize profits. Because profit maximization is an art 
and not a science, shareholders, if well enough informed (and most are 
not), may have different opinions about the decisions the board should be 
making. Boards, then, are necessarily given a lot of discretion and their 
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decisions are protected from liability by the business judgment rule. 
Shareholder (or residual claim) primacy does not mean honoring the spe-
cific desires of any one shareholder or group of shareholders, or putting 
ordinary business decisions to a shareholder vote. It simply means oper-
ating the company with the goal of maximizing the value of the residual 
claim.  
Larry Ribstein articulated the balance that managers must strike be-
tween profitability and responsibility and finds that one requires the oth-
er.89 A business will only be profitable if it can convince investors, ven-
dors, consumers, and employees, among others, to participate.90 It needs 
to be able to raise capital at an affordable price, hire and retain good em-
ployees, operate in desirable locations at low costs, and appeal to cus-
tomers, which includes appealing to customers’ sensibilities about health 
and fairness.91 
In order for each constituency to agree to make the firm-specific in-
vestments in the corporation at a price the company can afford, the cor-
poration must grant each group some concessions that are important to 
them.92 Employees of a certain qualification will be able to demand a 
certain wage in the labor market. Shareholders and creditors will want 
rights against management that they can enforce if management starts 
performing poorly. Creditors reserve control and exit rights, and share-
holders may demand a liquid market on which they can trade their stock 
and will be able to take advantage of the powers granted to them under 
state and federal law. Governments will require certain environmental 
standards be met or may impose other regulations in order to allow cor-
porations to operate in a certain way. Consumers will demand that prod-
ucts reach them at a price consistent with the market for goods of that 
kind and quality, and may also make demands about the company’s 
treatment of its employees or the environment, rewarding companies that 
seem particularly socially conscious by patronizing them more heavily.93 
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Many companies make socially conscious policies and practices a part of 
their branding to better appeal to consumers. All of these concessions to 
other stakeholders allow the firm to maximize the value of its residual 
claim.94 
Making concessions to other stakeholders also means giving them 
control over the corporation at times when they may be particularly vul-
nerable. That means that, at various points in the corporation’s life cycle, 
creditors may have more direct power over management than sharehold-
ers, or employees may be able to hold up the corporation’s business by 
striking. Governments can also deny permits or fail to pass tax breaks 
that make doing business affordable. The widely dispersed shareholders 
of public corporations are not able to overcome their collective action 
problem well enough to directly represent themselves to management, 
and so they will have to watch helplessly (or sell their stock) when an-
other constituency is able to exercise direct control over the firm. That 
does not mean that giving power to another stakeholder is against share-
holder interest. It is simply a cost of doing business—the cost of enticing 
the stakeholder to participate in the firm at a price the corporation could 
afford. If shareholders are allowed to vote on whether to give the other 
stakeholder the right to exercise power in certain circumstances, they 
would likely vote to approve the deal. Profit is not free. The benefits of 
obtaining the stakeholders’ investments exceed the likely costs of the 
concessions they are given, for the stakeholders may never get to—or 
have to—exercise the powers they have reserved. If all goes well, they 
will not need to. 
The board—and more realistically, senior management—are re-
sponsible for balancing these rights, interests, and contracts and are re-
sponsible for making sure that they do not conflict and that the firm is 
still free to operate profitably. This is the mediating hierarch role that 
Blair and Stout write about. The board manages all of the stakeholder 
relationships with the firm—the nexus of contracts.95 All of the contracts 
between the stakeholders and the firm fit together to form a working 
community of actors with various rights to the product of their team ef-
fort.96 That product, the one everyone wants to be as large as possible 
given relevant constraints, is the value of the residual claim. Even fixed 
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claimants want the residual claim to be enhanced when the firm is 
healthy because that profitability ensures the firm’s continued existence 
and saves the fixed claimants the costs of not being able to recover on 
their claims and of having to move their investment if the firm fails. 
Blair and Stout are mistaken that the balance means that sharehold-
er primacy is invalid. The balance is necessary to maximize profits.97 
And the balance is measured and struck according to its ability to allow 
the firm to operate profitably. Favoring the wrong stakeholder at the 
wrong time, or giving too much power to any particular stakeholder, can 
cause great damage to the firm. For example, it is not possible to meas-
ure corporate well-being solely by reference to the value realized by em-
ployees. Rather, the success of advantages given to employees is meas-
ured by the profitability and success of the firm and the firm’s enhanced 
ability to deliver a good product to its customers. 
The plight of General Motors in the early 2000s is an example of 
the problem of too heavily favoring a nonshareholder stakeholder. GM 
seems to have been operated for the benefit of its trade unions and credi-
tors for years as those debts were so pressing and the company was con-
stantly short of cash.98 The unions had extracted significant concessions 
from the firm.99 While workers were paid much higher wages than the 
industry average,100 they were also paid for time off when there was not 
enough work for them to do,101 and they were given generous pensions 
that GM simply could not afford to honor.102 The firm stayed out of 
bankruptcy for years by operating very conservatively for the benefit of 
their fixed claimants (creditors and employees), and never realized suc-
cess or significant profitability during that time because it was not taking 
chances on new products and was not making the adjustments necessary 
to keep up with changes in the product market.103 The firm finally failed, 
asking for government assistance in 2008104 and reorganizing in bank-
ruptcy in 2009.105 GM was able to limp along for years without much 
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success, but also without completely failing, even though it was not be-
ing operated for the benefit of the value of the residual claim. But it did 
not succeed, and ultimately became the poster child for the failure of 
running a for-profit corporation for some purpose other than shareholder 
profit. One of the biggest corporate failures of the last fifty years was not 
an example of short-termism taken to an extreme or shareholder primacy 
gone wrong; rather, employee primacy went wrong. 
One significant hole in the shareholder primacy view of corporate 
governance as a descriptive matter is that managers can make any deci-
sion they want and can usually spin it as a potential benefit to sharehold-
er value. Because profit maximization is an imprecise target and no one 
has perfect foresight, there is no way to know if a particular action could 
indeed benefit corporate wealth, and there is little recourse against man-
agement if a decision eventually proves to have been a bad one. It may 
be impossible to ever know whether one particular decision was a net 
benefit or harm to the firm’s bottom line, and there is no guarantee we 
could find out in the near term even if we could know some day.106 If we 
cannot know whether a particular decision benefits shareholder value, 
how can we say that maximizing shareholder value is the goal of mana-
gerial decision making? 
Instead, we have to ask how managers’ decisions are evaluated. 
They tend to be evaluated cumulatively, not singly, because stock price 
and other metrics of corporate success are the result of a large variety of 
factors of which each decision is only one. Blair and Stout would argue 
that we should trust managers to make the best decisions they can be-
cause managers have enough at stake in their own reputations that they 
will make good decisions for the world.107 However, even if we did gen-
erally feel that managers could be trusted to make good decisions for the 
world when running their companies—and many do not agree that that is 
the case, including many who oppose shareholder primacy—we would 
still need some way to evaluate whether a decision was good for the 
company, or even the world. Larry Ribstein points out this problem with 
trying to legislate social responsibility—there is just no reliable, predict-
able, or fair way to do it.108 There are as many different opinions about 
what is good for the world or a company as there are people who could 
give them. Society, shareholders, stakeholders, and even members of the 
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same board could disagree in good faith about what the morally correct 
decision is in any one circumstance. 
That is why it is easiest and most reliable to measure managers 
against one relatively predictable metric to guide them in one direction, 
even as that direction leaves open many different paths and could be in-
terpreted a variety of ways. Telling managers to maximize profits within 
certain constraints allows us, as a democratic society, to set constraints 
and also know what it is we are trying to limit. It keeps us from having to 
try to regulate the moving target that a managerial fiat would be and 
gives us predictable parameters with which to limit corporate action and 
decision making. 
Many may feel that it is immoral to tell managers that “all they 
have to do” is maximize profit. As this Essay has argued, though, even 
that command leaves managers a great deal of discretion in how to man-
age corporate assets and make decisions about corporate activities. Max-
imizing profit does not mean just one thing, and many limitations restrict 
a manager’s ability to drive toward the one, heartless goal. Rather, there 
are many benefits to considering other interests in the pursuit of profit. 
Creativity and good citizenship are often rewarded with profits, while 
irresponsible behavior is punished with economic failure. 
At the same time, the drive to “just maximize profits” does not real-
ly provide very much guidance. It results in a complicated decision mak-
ing process that can result in a variety of decisions. For the reasons Blair 
and Stout describe, even with a shareholder primacy viewpoint, corpo-
rate governance is not truly limited, and managers retain a great deal of 
discretion. It may well be less moral and more troublesome to allow 
managers to elicit firm-specific contributions from stakeholders and then 
do whatever they wish with those assets with no particular goal or prin-
ciple guiding their actions. Visibility and predictability allow for in-
formed investment by all stakeholders and allow us to properly constrain 
corporate action for society’s benefit. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Blair and Stout’s team production theory does an admirable job of 
explaining the nexus of contracts theory of the firm and of situating the 
board of directors within that theory. The team production theory also 
explains how the board serves as a mediating hierarch to coordinate the 
rights and interests of various corporate constituents. Its description of 
the role of the board in corporate governance is convincing. Yet, Blair 
and Stout reject the validity of the shareholder primacy view of corporate 
governance in their account, and do so unnecessarily. This Essay has ar-
gued that shareholder primacy is, in fact, consistent with Blair and 
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Stout’s team production theory. Once we adopt a realistic view of share-
holder wealth maximization, or residual claim maximization, we see that 
it is an important principle that guides directors in their work as mediat-
ing hierarchs. It tells them how to balance corporate contracts, which 
interests to prioritize, and when to do so. This Essay reconciles the 
shareholder primacy and team production views in an effort to bring 
those who oppose shareholder primacy closer to those who advocate it. 
